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LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW IN TWO
TRANSITIONAL DECADES

Theodore J. St. Antoine*

I. INTRODUCTION

Labor law became labor and employment law during the past several
decades. The connotation of "labor law" is the regulation of union-management
relations and that was the focus from the 1930s through the 1950s. In turn,
voluntary collective bargaining was supposed to be the method best suited for
setting the terms and conditions of employment for the nation's work force. 1
Since the 1960s, however, the trend has been toward more governmental
intervention to ensure nondiscrimination, safety and health, pensions and other
fringe benefits, and so on. 2 "Employment law" is now the term for the direct
federal or state regulation of individual employees' relations with their
employer. This paper will concentrate on the legal developments over the two
decades of existence of the Carl A. Warns, Jr. Institute of Labor and
Employment Law. But, I am going to indulge in the same kind of liberties with
exact dating that seems accepted by reputable historians. A growing consensus
among them is that the 19th century did not end until August 1914, when
World War I broke out, and the 21st century did not begin until "9/11." So I
can't resist going back to the watershed year of 1980 in my "two decades."
Part of the growth we have seen in employment law, as distinguished from
labor law, is attributable to the decline of organized labor. Government has had

James E. & Sarah A. Degan Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan.
'The official policy of the United States, as declared in the original Wagner Act, 49 Stat.
449 (1935), and confirmed in the more conservative Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), has
been one of "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining." 29 U.S.C. § 151
(2000).
2 See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e(17)
(2000); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000); the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2000); the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000); the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000); the Family and Medical Leave Act
of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
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to step in to fill the vacuum.3 Indeed, the drop in union membership has been
steep and dramatic. Since the early 1980s, it has gone down from about 19
million to 16 million while the nonagricultural work force has grown from
some 90 million to over 120 million. The result is that the rate of organization
has shrunk from 20.1% in 1983 to 13.2% in 2002. Since public sector
membership has remained steady at around 37%, this has meant a devastating
decline in the private sector, from approximately 16% in 1983 to 8.5% in 2002.
That is a loss rate of almost 50% in a mere 20 years.4
This is not the place for an extended discussion of the many reasons for the
decline in the American labor movement. 5 The shift from manufacturing to
service industries, automation and technological advances, job relocations from
the north to the south and southwest, more intense employer resistance,
unimaginative union leadership, and employee apathy have undoubtedly all
contributed. But, adverse decisions by an increasingly conservative federal
judiciary have almost surely played a role, and these will be part of my
overview of some major legal developments of the past two decades.
II. UNION EMPLOYER RELATIONS
A. Defining Protected "Employees"
A long, poignant history attends the definition of "employee" in the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 6 which of course is the threshold
question in determining whether an individual is entitled to the statute's
protections. Way back in 1944, the Supreme Court agreed with the National

3 See, e.g., Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the
Guard, 67 NEB. L. REV. 7, 9-10 (1988).
4 Bureau ofLabor Statistics News, USDL 03-88, February 25, 2003. Except for a shortlived spurt during the Korean War, the trend of the unionized work force in the United States
has been steadily downward since 1947, the year the Taft-Hartley Act was passed, when union
members constituted 33.1 percent of nonagricultural employment. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 1978
HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTIcs 507 (1978).
5 But see CHARLES B. CRAVER, CAN UNIONS SURVIVE? THE REJUVENATION OF THE
AMERICAN LABOR UNION (1993); WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE
AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (199 1); MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR
INTHE UNITED STATES (1987); THOMAS A. KOCHAN, HARRY C. KATZ & ROBERT B. MCKERSIE,
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUsTRIAL RELATIONS (1986); CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS,
THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT

INAMERICA, 1880-1960 (1985).
6 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000).
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Labor Relations Board (NLRB) that "newsboys" selling papers at fixed street
locations were "employees" under the Act, even though they might not have fit
within the "narrow technical legal relation of 'master and servant"' under the
common law.' The Taft-Hartley Congress excoriated this reliance on the
"theoretic 'expertness' of the Board" and said that common-law standards were
indeed intended to apply.8 The definition of "employee" was amended
expressly to exclude "independent contractors" as well as "supervisors." Thus
abashed, the Supreme Court has subsequently been wary of covering persons
who might appear subordinate to an employer in a hierarchical sense but who
for one reason or another do not fit the accepted common-law agency concept
of employees.
The plight of university faculty members dealing with supposedly heavyhanded administrators may not seem akin to that of newsboys battling William
Randolph Hearst. Nonetheless, two different generations of the Labor Board
were prepared to treat both groups as "employees" eligible for unionization
under the NLRA. The 1980 Supreme Court disagreed in a decision that ushers
in, and perhaps sets the tone for, my "two-decades" survey. In NLRB v. Yeshiva
University,9 a five-to-four majority held that the faculty of a "mature" private
university is more than a body of "professional" employees covered by the
NLRA. Instead, faculty members are "managerial" employees because of their
dominant role in formulating and implementing the institution's academic
policy. As managers, they are excluded from the Act. All that is very logical,
but the dissenters in Yeshiva insisted that the operation ofthe modem university
has been effectively transferred from the faculty to an autonomous
administration, which often has competing priorities. However debatable these
positions may be in theory, and even how sensible the majority decision might
be from an institutional perspective, the reality is that Yeshiva denies a group of
employees the collective representation they feel is necessary to promote their
interests vis-A-vis their employer.' 0
More important in numerical terms is the statutory exclusion of
"supervisors." The Supreme Court confronted the status of nurses as

7 NLRB

v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 124 (1944).
8 H.R. REP. No. 80-245, at 18 (1947).
9 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
10 See generally Marion G. Crain, Building Solidarity through Expansion of NLRA
Coverage: A Blueprint for Worker Empowerment, 74 MINN L. REv. 953 (1990); David M.
Rabban, DistinguishingExcluded Managersfrom CoveredProfessionalsunder the NLRA, 89
COLuM. L. REv. 1775 (1989); David M. Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate
Collective Bargainingby ProfessionalEmployees? 99 YALE L.J. 689 (1990).
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supervisors in NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. ofAm. " The Labor
Board had held that four licensed practical nurses who had been disciplined
were protected by the NLRA. Although the nurses had certain directive
functions regarding nurses' aides, the Board concluded that these duties were
not exercised "in the interest of the employer" when they were incidental to the
treatment of patients.' 2 Again a five-to-four majority of the Supreme Court
rejected the Board's reasoning, declaring that patient care was, in fact, the
business of the employer nursing home and thus was performed in the
employer's interest. The dissenters argued that since the Act expressly covers
"professional" employees, the term "supervisors" should not be extended so far
as to exclude nearly all professionals who may use "independent judgment" in
directing others' work. Once more, as in Yeshiva, there is strict logic in the
Court's stance. Yet the end result here too is to override the Board's presumed
expertise and to cut back on the number of employees who are able to assert
NLRA protections.
B. Union Access to Employees
Employer property rights have traditionally trumped organizational rights
under the NLRA, keeping unions from gaining access to employees in plants,
shops, stores, and other work sites.13 Exceptions have been recognized when a
plant and the employees' living quarters were so isolated that there were no
reasonable alternative means for the union to communicate.' 4 In Lechmere,
Inc.,15 a unanimous panel of Reagan-appointed Board members found such an
exception. The union had placed handbillers on a parking lotjointly owned by a
retail store in a shopping plaza in a large metropolitan area. When ordered to
leave, the organizers relocated to a grass strip of public property abutting a
four-lane divided turnpike, and tried to pass out leaflets to cars entering the
parking lot. The union also sent mailings to about forty of the store's 200

" 511 U.S. 571 (1994); see also NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001)
(holding that registered nurses are supervisors; 5-4 decision).
12 Section 2(11) of the NLRA defines "supervisor" as "any individual having authority, in
the interest of the employer, to ... responsibly direct [other employees] ... if... the exercise
of such authority.., requires the use of independent judgment." 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2000).
Section 2(3) excludes supervisors from the category of "employee." Id. § 152(3) (2000).
13 NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105 (1956) (overruling Board's decision
allowing union organizers to distribute literature on employer's parking lot and exterior
walkways).
14 See, e.g., id. at 112; NLRB v. S & H Grossinger's, Inc., 372 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1967)
(involving a remote mountain resort hotel).
15 Lechmere, Inc., 295 N.L.R.B. 92 (1989), enforced, 914 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1990).
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employees, whose addresses it had obtained by checking license plates in the
employee parking area. There were also some attempts to contact employees by
telephone or home visits. None of these efforts were fruitful. The Board
concluded the employees were effectively inaccessible to the union by means
other than on-site approaches, and held the employer in violation of the NLRA
for barring organizers from its parking lot.
A six-to-three majority of the Supreme Court reversed.16 Speaking for the
Court, Justice Thomas declared that the burden of establishing the "isolation"
necessary to justify access to an employer's property was "a heavy one."' 7 It
wasn't satisfied by "mere conjecture or the expression of doubts concerning the
effectiveness of nontrespassory means of communication." ' 8 "[S]igns or
advertising" were suggested as "reasonably effective."' 9 In light of the realities
of the wide dispersal of employees throughout large metropolitan areas, and the
difficulty of luring them from their television sets or backyard barbeques to
gather at a union meeting hall, one might fairly ask whether the workplace is
not the most natural forum for the exchange of views about the merits of
unionization. At the same time, however, Justice Thomas may be entitled to
more than "mere conjecture." A national union could be well advised to invest
in some genuine socio-psychological studies to demonstrate empirically the
futility of attempting to reach today's urban, suburban, and ambulatory work
force by the conventional methods that the majority of the Supreme Court
apparently feels are still adequate.

C. PermanentReplacements
Ancient dictum has it that during an economic strike an employer may hire
"permanent replacements," who need not be displaced to make way for striking
employees who wish to return at the end of the strike.20 More recently, a further

twist was added in Trans World Airlines v. IndependentFederationof Flight
Attendants.2 ' There the Supreme Court held, six to three, that the same
principle applies to enable an employer to retain junior employees who worked
during the strike rather than reinstate strikers with greater seniority. Justices

16Lechmere,
17

Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992).

Id.at 540.

18Id.
19 Id.

20NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938).
21 489 U.S. 426 (1989) (decided under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188

(2000)).
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Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented, primarily on the grounds this
action was "inherently destructive" of the right to strike. They regarded such a
preference for "crossover" employees as more detrimental to the bargaining
unit than promising permanence to new hires from outside, since it amounts to
a "divide and conquer" technique threatening the solidarity of the employee
unit. 22 In either instance, of course, permanent replacement is a powerful
disincentive to strike, and an awesome weapon in the hands of any employer
willing and able to use it.
Following the TWA decision, the AFL-CIO took an action that most
disinterested observers would probably have labeled quixotic. It filed a
complaint against the Government of the United States with the International
Labor Organization, alleging that the permanent replacement of strikers
violated freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain
collectively. 23 The AFL-CIO's task was not made easier because the United
States has ratified neither ILO Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association
nor Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining.
Sole reliance thus had to be placed on the more general language of the ILO
Constitution, to which the United States is a party. Nonetheless, the ILO's
Committee on Freedom of Association recommended that the United States
Government "take into account that, if a strike is legal, recourse to the use of
labour drawn from outside the undertaking to replace the strikers for an
indeterminate period entails a risk of derogation from the right to strike, which
may affect the free exercise of trade union rights. 24 Not surprisingly, the rest is
silence. The United States did not deign to reply. It was neither the first nor the
last time that American labor and employment law has been out of line with
that of most of the industrial world.
D. Consumer Boycotts
Whether or not I agree with them, I find most of the Supreme Court
decisions discussed so far well reasoned, with the conclusions flowing logically
from the premises. I now come to a case where I don't feel this is true. In
NLRB v. Retail Clerks Local 1001 [Safeco],25 the Supreme Court held, six to
three, that picketing asking consumers not to buy a nonunion product being

22

Id. at 448-49.

23

2 78th Report of the Committee on Freedom ofAssociation, 74 INTERNATIONAL LABoUR
15 (1991, Series B).
Id.at 27.

OFFICE OFFICIAL BULLETIN
24
25

447 U.S. 607 (1980).
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distributed by a second party could be forbidden as an unlawful boycott under
the NLRA where the distributor derived ninety % of its income from the sale of
the picketed product. The constitutional question of free speech received short
26
shrift, a single paragraph, in a four-member opinion by Justice Powell. 27
Nowhere is there the slightest indication that the Supreme Court precedents
relied on were distinguishable in that they dealt with appeals for concerted
employee action or action by unionized workers presumably subject to group
loyalties and discipline. Nowhere is it recognized that Safeco was the first time
the Court had ever clearly upheld a ban on peaceful picketing addressed to, and
calling for seemingly lawful responses by, individual consumers acting on their
own.
Justices Blackmun and Stevens, concurring in part, did not join in Justice
Powell's "cursory discussion" of the free speech issue, thus leaving the Court
without a majority opinion on the constitutional question.28 Unfortunately, their
own efforts leave much to be desired. Justice Blackmun reasoned limply: "I am
reluctant to hold unconstitutional Congress' striking of the delicate balance
between union freedom of expression and the ability of neutral employers,
employees, and consumers to remain free from coerced participation in
industrial strife. 29 Where was the evidence that consumers were coerced, either
in this case or generally?
Justice Stevens had more interesting things to say, but I also find
inadequate his distinction between picketing and handbilling: "[T]he principal
reason why handbills containing the same message are so much less effective
than labor picketing is that the former depend entirely on the persuasiveforce
of the idea. ,30 Cannot the handbiller confront the approaching customer with
the same pair of beady eyes as the picketer? Or is it the sign on the stick that
bothered Justice Stevens? Unless we expect the stick to be wielded as a
weapon, it would surely seem improper to forbid the picket sign but not the
handbill merely because the placard may be more visible and thus more likely
to catch a busy shopper's eye. 31 And what if the placards were not carried on
sticks by burly laborers, but, as has been done, were draped over the shoulders

26

1d. at 616.
IBEW Local 501 v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951).
28 Safeco, 447 U.S. at 617-18.
27 E.g.,

29 Id.
30 Id.

at 619 (emphasis added).

31Cf Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775 (1942) (Douglas, J.,

concurring) (posing the question of whether a state "can prohibit picketing when it is effective
but may not prohibit it when it is ineffective?").
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of elderly men and women? Finally, suppose the pickets were not union
organizers, but an African-American civil-rights group peacefully urging
moviegoers not to attend "The Birth of a Nation?"
The three dissenters in Safeco, Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White, did
not even attempt to grapple with the First Amendment issue. They contented
themselves with the statutory question, concluding that the NLRA did not
forbid peaceful consumer picketing aimed solely at a nonunion product rather
than the neutral distributor's business as such,
regardless of the %age of the
32
neutral's sales represented by that product.
Professor Archibald Cox, while recognizing the deficiencies of the Safeco
opinions, believed the decision could "be fitted into the body of First
Amendment law if picketing is classified with commercial advertising as
economic speech. 33 There is certainly logic in that position, especially if it
were a question of first impression. But relegating picketing to the category of
commercial advertising would be a major departure from the attitudes
expressed toward union picketing appeals ever since the seminal case of
Thornhill v. Alabama.34 Said the Court in Thornhill's companion decision,
Carlson v. California,35 "The carrying of signs and banners, no less than the
raising of a flag, is a natural and appropriate means of conveying information
on matters ofpublic concern. 36
Not all the Supreme Court decisions of the past two decades have been
adverse to organized labor. Ironically, an even more conservative Court than the
one that had decided Safeco, and sharply limited the constitutional status of
picketing, later handed labor unions a major organizing weapon by maintaining
the distinction between picketing and handbilling, and by sustaining the right to
handbill customers with much the same sort of strained statutory construction

32

Safeco, 447 U.S. at 622-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing NLRB v. Fruit& Vegetable

PackersLocal 760 [Tree Fruits],377 U.S. 58 (1964), to avoid difficult constitutional questions,
picketing asking consumers not to buy one single nonunion product in a neutral supermarket
was held
not a forbidden secondary boycott).
33
ARCHIBALD Cox, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 47 (1980). Cf Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v.
Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 576 (1988) ("We do not suggest
that communications by labor unions are never of the commercial speech variety and thereby
entitled to a lesser degree of constitutional protection.").
14 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
35
310 U.S. 106 (1940)
36 Id. at 112-13 (emphasis added). Even the more conservative Justice Frankfurter was
ready to concede, "Peaceful picketing is the workingman's means of communication." Milk
Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 293 (1941).
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used by the Warren Court to exempt a limited form of consumer picketing. 37 In

Edward J DeBartolo Corp. v. FloridaGulf Coast Building & Construction
Trades Council, 38 a union had a dispute with a building contractor over its
allegedly substandard wages and fringe benefits. The contractor was hired to
construct a department store in a shopping mall. The union peacefully
distributed handbills at the entrances of the mall, urging customers not to
patronize any of the shops in the mall until all construction was done by
contractors paying "fair wages and fringe benefits." The handbills made clear,
however, that the union was not seeking a work stoppage by any store
employees. The National Labor Relations Board ruled the consumer
handbilling was "coercion" of the secondary employers in violation of Section
8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA.39
In an opinion by Justice White, six members ofthe Court observed that the
Board's construction of the statute would pose serious questions of its validity
under the First Amendment. 40 Here there was no picketing or patrolling.
Picketing is "qualitatively different"; handbills "depend entirely on the
persuasive force of the idea.""' Justice White declared: "The loss of customers
because they read a handbill urging them not to patronize a business, and not
because they are intimidated by a line of picketers, is the result of mere
persuasion. '4 2 Justice White went on to note for the Court that the NLRB's
reading would prohibit newspaper, radio, and television appeals to the same
effect as the handbills. Nothing in the language or legislative history of Section
8(b)(4), the Court concluded, prevented interpreting it as not reaching peaceful
handbilling, and thus the constitutional questions were avoided. 43 DeBartolo
has significantly expanded the publicity tactics available to labor organizations,

37 See Fruitand Vegetable PackersLocal 760, 377 U.S. at 58.
3' 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
39 Id. at 573 (The Eleventh Circuit denied enforcement in Fla.GulfCoast Bldg. & Constr.

Trades Council v. NLRB, 796 F.2d 1328 (11th Cir. 1986).).
40 Id. at 575. There were no dissents. Justices O'Connor and Scalia concurred in the
judgment. Justice Kennedy did not participate. For Justice White the handbills did not appear
"typical commercial speech" advertising the price or merits of a product since they "pressed the
benefits of unionism to the community" and "the dangers of inadequate wages to the economy."
But even as commercial speech the handbills would present serious constitutional issues. Id. at
576.
41 Id. at 580 (quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289,311 n. 17 (1979) and Hughes
v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465 (1950)). The same language was also quoted in Justice
Stevens' concurrence in NLRB v. Retail Clerks Local 1001 [Safeco], 447 U.S. 607,619 (1980).
42 DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 580.
43
Id. at 588.
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and has led to so-called "corporate campaigns" against nonunion firms through
widespread nonpicketing appeals to suppliers and customers.44
E. Collective Bargaining
The National Labor Relations Act requires employers to bargain with the
representative of their employees concerning "wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment." 45 Perhaps the most persisting issue concerning
the duty to bargain has been the extent to which employers must negotiate
about decisions that result in the shrinkage of employees' job opportunities.
Examples include subcontracting, automation, and plant relocations. The
crucial question is whether a subject is classified as a "condition of
employment" or as a management right.46 In the Fibreboardcase,47 the
Supreme Court of the Warren era gave limited approval to the Labor Board's
expansion of so-called mandatory subjects of bargaining to include a
manufacturer's subcontracting out of maintenance work within a plant. The
Court emphasized that this did not alter the company's basic operation or
require any capital investment.48
In the early 1980s, the Court appeared to cut back on employers'
obligations. It held in First NationalMaintenance Corp. v. NLRB 49 that a
custodial firm did not have to bargain about terminating an unprofitable
contract to provide janitorial services to a nursing home. A balancing test was
applied. Bargaining over management decisions that have a substantial impact
on job opportunities would be required "only if the benefit, for labormanagement relations and the collective-bargaining process, outweighs the
burden placed on the conduct of the business."5 ° The Court then stated broadly
that an employer has no duty to bargain about a decision "to shut down part of

44 See, e.g., Brown & Root v. La. State AFL-CIO, 10 F.3d 316 (1994) (lobbying); cf

SequoiaConstr. Inc. v. Operating Eng'rs Local 12, 136 L.R.R.M. 2021 (D. Nev. 1990) (leaflets
and newspaper article). See generally Thomas C. Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule:
Unions, Associations, Our First Amendment Discourse and the Problem of DeBartolo, 1990
Wis. L. REV. 149; James Gray Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions and Boycotts: The Old
Labor Law,the New Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 TEX. L. REV. 889 (1991).
4'29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), 158(d), 159(a) (2000).
46
See, e.g., NLRB v. Wooster Div. Of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
47 Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 209 (1964).
48 Id. at 216.
49 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
'oId.at 679.
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its business purely for economic reasons.",5' But it backed away from that
sweeping pronouncement by pointing out that the operation in this particular
case was not being moved elsewhere and the laid-off employees were not going
to be replaced, the employer's dispute with the nursing home concerned the
size of a management fee over which the union had no control, and the union
had only recently won recognition and thus there was no disruption of an
ongoing relationship. That left unanswered many questions regarding the more
typical situation of a partial closing or a plant relocation. 2
Imposing a duty to bargain over such employer decisions as subcontracting,
plant removals, and technological change would delay transactions, reduce
business flexibility, and perhaps interfere with the confidentiality of
negotiations with third parties. In some instances bargaining would be doomed
in advance as a futile exercise. Yet there is much evidence, including
management testimony, of the practical contribution that the men and women
on the shop floor can make to the competitive success of an enterprise through
their first-hand knowledge of what really goes on.53 Moreover, the closer we
move toward recognizing that employees may have something akin to a
property interest in their jobs, 54 the more apparent it may become that not even
the employer's legitimate regard for profit making or the public's justified
concern for a productive economy should totally override the workers' claim to
a voice in the decisions of ongoing enterprises that will vitally affect their future
employment opportunities. A moral value is arguably at stake in determining
the role employees ought to play in management decision making. As labor
economist Neil Chamberlain has put it: "[T]he workers' struggle for increasing
participation in business decisions ... is highly charged with an ethical

51

d. at 686.

52Cf Dubuque Packing Co., 303 N.L.R.B. 386 (1991), enforced sub. nom. Food &

Commercial Workers Local 150-A v. NLRB, I F.3d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (relocation without
basic change in operation is prima facie a mandatory subject of bargaining but employer may
rebut, e.g., by showing labor costs not a factor). See generally Michael Harper, Leveling the
Roadfrom Borg-Warner to FirstNational Maintenance:The Scope of MandatoryBargaining,
68 VA. L. REv. 1447 (1982); Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Collective BargainingProcess, in
AMERICAN
LABOR POLICY 215 (Charles J. Morris ed., 1987).
5
3 See, e.g., THOMAS A. KOCHAN & PAUL OSTERmAN, THE MJTUAL GAINS ENTERPRISE 14868 (1994); Eugene L. Hartwig, New Directionsin Collective Bargaining,in AMERICAN LABOR
POLIcY 240, 244-46 (Charles J. Morris ed. 1987).
54 See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon & Edward R. Lev, Changes in the Bonding
of the
Employment Relationship:An Essay on the New Property,20 B.C.L. REV. 457 (1979); William
B. Gould IV, The Idea of the Job as Property in ContemporaryAmerica: The Legal and
Collective BargainingFramework, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 885.
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content.... [L]egal and economic arguments, technological and political
considerations must give way before widely held moral convictions.""5
F. Arbitration
Of all the aspects of union-management relations considered by the
Supreme Court during the past two decades, arbitration was the one in which
there was the greatest unanimity. Arbitration was also the area in which unions
and employees fared the best. Yet employers could find this a blessing in
disguise, saving them the time and expense of extended court litigation. In
AT&T Technologies v. Communications Workers,56 the Court reaffirmed and7
refined four principles set forth in the famed 1960 Steelworkers Trilogy
concerning the judicial enforcement of an executory agreement to arbitrate:
"

Arbitration is a matter of contract and a party need not arbitrate unless
it has so agreed. 8

*

The court, not the arbitrator, is to decide whether a party
has agreed to
59
arbitrate, unless the parties clearly provide otherwise.

*

The arbitrator, not the court, is to decide the claim under the collective
bargaining
agreement, even if the claim appears frivolous to the
0
court.

*

6

If the contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption of
arbitrability. 6' Arbitration should not be denied unless the clause
cannot be interpreted
as covering the dispute.62 Doubts are resolved in
63
favor of coverage.

55 NEIL W. CHAMBERLAIN, THE UNION CHALLENGE TO MANAGEMENT CONToL
56

8-9 (1948).

475 U.S. 643 (1986).

Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593
(1960). (The first two cases dealt with the enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate; Enterprise
dealt with the enforcement of an arbitral award once issued. Generally, Enterpriseheld that a
court should not review the merits of an award and should confine itself to such questions as
whether there was any fraud or corruption, denial of due process, or exceeding of the arbitrator's
commission.)
" AT&T Tech., 475 U.S. at 648.
'9 Id. at 649.
60 Id. at 649-50.
61 Id. at 650.
57

62
63

id.
id.
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Some parties, most often employers, balk at the application of these
standards in certain extreme cases. That is an understandable human reaction,
but both logic and policy are on the side of the Court. A typical arbitration
clause covers "all disputes arising under the contract," with rare exclusions, and
is not limited to "meritorious" or "nonfrivolous" claims. 64 And as a practical
matter, even the arbitration of frivolous claims may serve a therapeutic
function, clearing the air and letting the parties get on with their business.
Probably the most controversial issue of recent years has been the authority
of a court to set aside an arbitration award on the grounds it violates "public
policy." In Paperworker'sInternational Union v. Misco, Inc.,65 the Fifth
Circuit had refused to enforce an arbitrator's reinstatement of an employee
whose job was operating a dangerous paper-cutting machine, and whose car
had been found to contain marijuana while in the company parking lot. The
Supreme Court reversed, declaring that "as long as the arbitrator is even
arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his
authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice
to overturn his decision. ' 66 The Court naturally recognized the general common
law doctrine that a contract will not be enforced if it violates the law or public
policy. 67 But it cautioned that there must be "'some explicit public policy' that
is 'well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws
and legal precedents
and not from general considerations of supposed public
68

interests."

Not all the lower courts seemed willing to accept this message. The
Supreme Court had to reinforce the lesson in EasternAssociatedCoal Corp.v.
United Mine Workers District of America 1 7.69 This time an arbitrator had
ordered the reinstatement of a truck driver who had twice tested positive for
marijuana. 70 A three-months' suspension was substituted for the discharge,
however, and the employee had to undergo drug treatment and testing and to
accept "last chance" terms in his reinstatement. 7' The employer argued that the
award was contrary to public policy but the Court disagreed. 72 It first

64See Greentree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 2402, 2410 (2003).
65

484 U.S. 29 (1987).

66Id.
at38.
67
1d. at43.
68

Id.at 43 (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983)).
U.S. 57 (2000).
Id.at 60.

69 531
70

71 Id. at

61.

72 Id.at 61-67.
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emphasized that the award should be treated as the equivalent of an agreement
by the parties on the meaning of "just cause. 7 3 It then applied Misco, pointing
out that the relevant federal statute and Department of Transportation
regulations contained both antidrug and rehabilitation provisions for safetysensitive positions and nothing that would specifically prohibit the grievant's
reemployment.7 4 Justices Scalia and Thomas, concurring, would have gone
even further. They would refuse to enforce an agreement or award only on75the
grounds it violated some positive law, and not any other "public policy.
One should think that with a unanimous Supreme Court sustaining the
award in Eastern Associated Coal, and with two of the most conservative
Justices its most ardent champions, the final stake would have been driven
through the heart of nebulous public policy challenges to arbitration. But the
objectors have shown remarkable resilience over the years, and there is still
available the claim that an award does not "draw its essence" from the
collective bargaining agreement or that the arbitrator has attempted to "dispense
his own brand of industrial justice. 7 6
III. EXCEPTIONS TO EMPLOYMENT AT WILL
The most important and dramatic development in employment law over the
last couple of decades came at the state level, not the federal. State courts began
to carve out exceptions, on one theory or another, to the long-standing and
pernicious doctrine of "employment at will." As bluntly stated in a famous 19th
century decision, this principle meant that employers may "discharge or retain
employees at will for good cause or for no cause, or even for bad cause .... ",7
That was the well-nigh universal rule in the United States, except for certain
statutory protections against discrimination because of race, sex, union activity,
and the like, until a California court encountered a situation it simply could not

71 Id. at 62.
74 Id. at 63-65.
71 Id. at 68-69.

Steelworkers v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). For a pessimistic
view of the likelihood of keeping the courts' hands off labor arbitration awards, see David E.
Feller, Presidential Address: Bye-Bye Trilogy, Hello Arbitration! in ARBITRATION 1993:
T
ARBITRATION AND THE CHANGING WORLD OF WORK, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 46
ANNUAL
MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 1, 9-13 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 1994).
77 Payne v. Western & A.R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884) (overruledon other grounds
by Hutton v. Walters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915)); see also HORACE G. WOOD, LAW OF MASTER
AND SERVANT 272-73 (1877).
76
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stomach.78 In this case, an employer had fired an employee for refusing to
perjure himself on behalf of the employer.7 9 That, the court declared, was
actionable as contrary to public policy.80 Such a ruling was a rarity, however,
and it was not until the watershed year of 1980 that one saw the beginning of a
glacial movement in the state courts to temper the worst rigors of employment
at will.
Three principal theories, with variants, came into use. Torts included
discharges contrary to public policy8 ' and abusive or retaliatory discharges.8 2
Contract claims could be based on oral commitments to an employee at the time
of hiring8 3 or statements of policy in personnel manuals. 8 4 The third, and
potentially most expansive theory of recovery for wrongful discharge, is based
on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but only about a dozen
states have accepted it.8 5 Eventually, only Louisiana and Rhode Island seem to
have failed to embrace one or more of these various theories.86
From an employee's perspective, there are serious deficiencies in these
judicially developed doctrines. Contracts call for promises, and nothing
compels employers to guarantee job security. In any event, properly drafted and

78 Peterman v. Teamsters Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).

Id. at 26.
'o Id. at 27.
79

81 See generally Tameny v. Atd. Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (employee
refused to join price-fixing conspiracy); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods Inc., 427 A.2d 385
(Conn. 1980) (whistleblower); Palmateer v. Int'l. Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876 (I11.1981)
(same); contra Murphy v. Am. Home Prod. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983) (whistleblower).
82 See generally Lucas v. Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984) (employee
refused foreman's sexual advances; applying Arkansas law); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale
Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz, 1985) (employee refused to join co-workers in
"mooning"); Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1992) (employee supported co-worker's
sexual harassment charges; court said retaliation claim must be based on constitutional or
statutory provision). But cf Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (I11.1991) (in-house counsel
not allowed to claim retaliatory discharge).
83 Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. 1981); Grouse v. Group Health
Plan, 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981) (reliance also a factor); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).
84 See Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985); Weiner v. McGrawHill, Inc., 443 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1982) (reliance also a factor).
85 Buysse v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 623 F.2d 1244 (8th Cir. 1980) (applying
Minnesota law); Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988); Fortune v. National
Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977); contra Murphy v. American Home Prod.
Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983).
86 9A LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 505:51 (2004).
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conspicuous disclaimers can extinguish contractual claims.8 7 Employers may be
able to revoke previous promises contained in personnel manuals through a
reasonable notice to the work force.88 As a practical matter, binding oral
commitments might largely be confined to higher-level jobs, since it has been
held that general assurances of continuing employment are inadequate; some
specific bargaining over job security may be required.8 9 Tort theories will
ordinarily be useful only in egregious cases. Honorable, well-advised employers
are rarely if ever going to engage in outlandish conduct that violates public
policy or otherwise supports claims of abusive behavior. Finally, as indicated
earlier, the most expandable concept, the covenant of good faith, is recognized
in only a small number of states. Even there, the usual approach is to determine
whether the employer acted honestly and reasonably in discharging an
employee, not whether it was objectively correct in its judgment about the
supposed misconduct or poor performance. 90
Nearly all employees covered by collective bargaining agreements can be
discharged only if there is "good cause." If nonunion workers are ever to enjoy
similar protections against arbitrary treatment, legislative will probably be
necessary. To date Montana is the only state that has enacted a statutory "good
cause" requirement for the dismissal of covered employees. 9 1In 1991, however,
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (ULC) - a
mainstream body of lawyers, judges, and state legislators - adopted the Model
Employment Termination Act (META)92 by a 39-11 vote of the state
delegations. META would protect most full-time, non-probationary employees
- those working twenty or more hours a week after one year of service - against

See generally Reid v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453 (6th Cir. 1986) (applying
Michigan law); Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277 (Iowa 1995)
(unambiguous disclaimer effective despite placement on last page of 53-page handbook). But cf
Jones v. Central Peninsula General Hosp., 779 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1989) (one-sentence disclaimer
in 85-page manual ineffective as unclear and inconspicuous).
88In re Certified Question (Bankey v. Storer Broadcasting Co.), 443 N.W.2d 112 (Mich.
1989). But cf Doyle v. Holy Cross Hosp., 682 N.E.2d 68 (I11.1997) (12-year-old commitment
could not be revoked without employee's consent).
89 Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 473 N.W.2d 268 (Mich. 1991).
90 Cf Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int'l, Inc., 948 P.2d 412 (Cal. 1998).
91MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-915 (2003); see also Marcy v. Delta Airlines,
166 F.3d 1279 (9th Cir. 1999) (under Montana statute, employer's good faith is no defense if
employee was discharged under mistaken view of the facts; 2-1 decision); 29 P.R. LAws ANN. §
185a 92(2001) (providing indemnity upon discharge).
17

MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT,

7A U.L.A. 428. See generallyTheodore J. St.

Antoine, The Making of the Model Employment TerminationAct, 69 WASH. L. REv. 361 (1994).
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discharge without good cause. 93 "Good cause" may be based upon either
employee conduct or business needs.94 Despite this endorsement by the
prestigious ULC, a dozen years later no state has joined Montana in prohibiting
wrongful discharge. That leaves the United States as the only major industrial
democracy in the world that has not heeded the call of the International Labor
Organization for laws preventing the termination of workers when there is no
valid reason. 9'
Elsewhere I have discussed at some length the pros and cons of at-will
employment. Without it, there might be a modest loss in employer flexibility
in the operation of the business. That has not seemed an excessive burden in all
the other industrial nations where the doctrine does not exist. On the other side
is simple justice - and devastating psychic, social, and economic effects on
dismissed employees and their families. Why, after all, should an employer
wish to fire a worker when, by definition, there is no good reason? Yet any
experienced labor arbitrator has seen it happen. I would even maintain that a
good-cause regime would work to management's benefit as well. Much
evidence shows, for example, that a work force which feels secure is more
likely to have a record for high productivity and quality output. 97
In 1984, I had the privilege to address the very first of these annual Labor
and Employment Law Institutes, now named in honor of Carl A. Warns, Jr. My
title was "The Twilight of Employment at Will? An Update." 98 Socially, I could
not have asked for a warmer or more generous reception. Intellectually, at least
in terms of my impact on the legal order, it was as if I had never appeared. At
any rate, the question I raised about the status of employment at will has been.
answered. It was not twilight for the doctrine back in 1984; indeed, we hadn't
even reached high noon! Nonetheless, I remain hopeful. It took us some fifty

9'META, 7A U.L.A. 433.
94Id. § 1(4), 7A U.L.A. 429.
95

Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee on Labor and Employment

Law, At-Will Employment and the Problem of Unjust Dismissal, 36 THE RECORD 170, 175
(1981); Termination of Employment Convention, 1982 (No. 158), INT'L LABOUR ORG., 3 INT'L
LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, 1977-1985 at 164 (1996).
96 See Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads
Toward Full Flower,67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 65-70 (1988).
97 See ANTHONY G. ATHOS & RICHARD T. PASCALE, THE ART OF JAPANESE MANAGEMENT
131-57 (1979); Fred K. Foulkes, Large Nonunionized Employers, in U.S. INDuSTRIAL
RELATIONS 1950-1980: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 129, 134-36, 14144, 155-56 (1981); cf SPECIAL
TASK FORCE, DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, WORK IN AMERICA 93-110, 188-201

(1973).
98FIRST ANNUAL LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW INST. I (William F. Dolson ed. 1985).
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years longer than that hardly liberal statesman, Chancellor Bismarck of
Germany, to see the need for Social Security. In the long run, this is a wise, fair,
and caring society. Going by the Bismarck timetable, and counting from the
ILO's adoption of its Employment Termination Convention of 1982, 99 I have
every confidence that by the year 2032 the vast majority of the states, or
preferably the U.S. Congress, will have seen the light. No longer will American
workers be subject to discharge "at will."' 00
IV. STATUS DISCRIMINATION - RACE, SEX RELIGION, AGE

A. PrincipalTheories of Discrimination
By the 1980s, the Supreme Court had already erected the conceptual
framework for two theories of discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, which forbids discrimination in employment because of race, color,
sex, religion, and national origin.' 0' Discrimination could consist of disparate
treatment, i.e., intentional distinctions based on prohibited grounds,'0 2 or it
could consist of disparate impact, i.e., unintended but prohibited distinctions
resulting from seemingly neutral job standards or qualifications. 0 3 The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) forbids discrimination on
the basis of age against persons at least 40 years old. 0 4 A 1993 Supreme Court
decision left it uncertain, however, whether disparate impact analysis applies to
the ADEA.'1 5 The last two decades have focused on further refinements of
these basic doctrines.

99 See INT'L LABOUR ORGANIZATION, supra note 94.

1oo
See generally Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contractat Will, 51 UNIV. CHI. L.
REV. 947 (1984); Clyde W. Summers, IndividualProtectionAgainst Unjust Dismissal:Time for
a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976).
0142 U.S.C. §§ 2000e -2000e(17) (2000).
102E.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (black applicant alleged
he was denied employment because of his civil right activities and because of his race and
color).
103 E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (employer required high
school
education or passing of standardized intelligence test for certain jobs even though these
standards were not shown to be related to job performance and they disqualified blacks at a
substantially higher rate than whites).
104 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
1o5
The Court avoided the issue in Hazen PaperCo. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993), but
suggested impact analysis might not be suitable for ADEA. The lower courts are now divided.
Compare Mullin v. Raytheon, 164 F.3d 696 (1st Cir. 1999) (impact theory unavailable), with
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B. Proving Discrimination
The Supreme Court has not always found it that easy to spell out or follow
an appropriate methodology for proving discrimination. Even in dealing with
the seemingly simpler issue of intentional discrimination, the Justices split
sharply in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks.106 Hicks, a black man, was hired
as a correctional officer at a halfway house and was later promoted to a
supervisory position. For some time he enjoyed a good service record but
problems developed with a change in management. Hicks was demoted for
failing to ensure that his subordinates complied with reporting rules and he was
later fired for threatening his immediate superior. Hicks claimed racial
discrimination. Under the accepted three-step rubric for disparate treatment
cases, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case; the defendant then has
the burden of producing evidence of the legitimate reasons for its actions; and
finally the plaintiff has the opportunity to show the proffered reasons were a
pretext and race the true motive'0 7 At all times the plaintiff bears the ultimate
burden of persuasion. 108
In Hicks, the trial court found that the reasons presented by the employer the plaintiff's supervisory failings and his threatening of a superior- were not
the real reasons for his demotion and discharge. Yet the court still held that
Hicks had not carried the burden of proving race was the determining factor
rather than mere personal animosity. A five-to-four majority of the Supreme
Court agreed. A stinging dissent by Justice Souter pointed out that had the
employer remained silent, Hicks would have prevailed on the unrebutted
presumption created by his prima facie case. Instead, the dissenters
remonstrated, an employer can escape liability by "lying" about why it acted.' 09
Despite the powerful logic of Justice Souter's dissent, Professor Deborah
Malamud argues for the soundness of the majority's result." 0 The basic
problem, she maintains, is the three-step proof process itself and the
Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466 (8th Cir. 1996).
106

509 U.S. 502 (1993).

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).

107 McDonnell

108

'09 Hicks, 509 U.S. at 528, 538-40. Subsequently the Supreme Court declared unanimously
that "a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's
asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer
unlawfully discriminated." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000)
(emphasis added). See generallyKenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting
Approach in Employment DiscriminationCases, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 703 (1995).
11o Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: DisparateTreatment after Hicks, 93 MICH. L.
REv. 2229 (1995).
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nonuniformity it has generated because of "the extraordinary variability in the
actual content of the prima facie case in the lower courts."'1' She would
abandon the artificial three-step proof structure and forthrightly declare that
"the only relevant question at trial would be whether the plaintiff
has proven
' 21
evidence."
the
of
preponderance
a
by
discrimination
intentional
In two other cases, Supreme Court efforts to toughen the proof process in
discrimination cases were shortly thereafter overturned or qualified by
Congress. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,"l3 the Court held that even though a
female plaintiff proved that her gender was a motivating factor in denying her a
position, the employer could escape liability and avoid any remedy by showing
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have taken the same action for
nondiscriminatory reasons anyway. The 1991 Civil Rights Act provided instead
that an unlawful employment practice would be established by showing that
prohibited grounds were "a motivating factor."' " 4 But the Act also provided that
if a defendant can demonstrate it would have made the same decision in the
absence of the impermissible factor, then there will be no damages or job
placement for the individual claimant. The court may, however, grant injunctive
relief, attorney fees, and costs.
Congress also rebuffed the Supreme Court's introduction of a new twist in
proving disparate impact cases. Conventionally, the plaintiff employee
establishes a prima facie case by demonstrating the differential effect of the
challenged job qualification or practice. The defendant employer must then
offer a legitimate business justification. But the Court in Ward's Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio1 5 held that the employer did not have to prove that the contested
practice was job-related and that the test was not "business necessity" but only
"legitimate employment goals." 16 The response of the 1991 Civil Rights Act
was to place the burden of persuasion on the defendant "that the challenged
practice isjob related ...
and consistent with business necessity." ' 7 Thus, as to
both the applicable criterion and the burden of proving it, Congress shifted the
responsibility in favor of the employee. At least in these contexts, the Congress
of the early 1990s appeared significantly more liberal than the Supreme Court.

..
' Id. at 2318.
121d.at

2317-18.

...
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
11442 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000) (emphasis added).
...
490 U.S. 642 (1989) (5-4 decision).
6
1 Id. at 659.
"' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000).
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C. BFOQAND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEFENSES
Two major defenses that may be raised against charges of unlawful
employment discrimination are that the otherwise impermissible classification
is (1) a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) or (2) a component of a
legitimate affirmative action program. BFOQs are applicable to sex, religion,
national origin, and age, but not to race.' 18 The BFOQ defense has always been
narrowly construed.' 19
A good example of the strict construction of the BFOQ is Western Air
Lines v. Criswell.120 The Federal Aviation Administration required pilots and
first officers to retire upon reaching the age of sixty, but did not impose
mandatory retirement on flight engineers. Flight engineers were the third person
in the cockpits of large aircraft but they did not take over the controls unless
both the pilot and first officer were incapacitated. Western's pension plan
required all members to retire at age sixty. Two pilots retiring under the
mandatory provision of the FAA rule and wishing to become flight engineers,
and a flight engineer retiring under the mandatory provision of the pension
plan, sued on the grounds the mandatory provisions violated the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.
The Court agreed, concluding that the BFOQ standard was one of
"reasonable necessity," not reasonableness. The Court expressly rejected the
notion that the employer's requirement should be upheld on a "rational basis"
test. Nevertheless, the Court recognized that Congress had allowed a BFOQ to
be asserted if the employer could show that (1) substantially all employees
above a specified age were unable to perform their jobs safely and efficiently
and (2) it was impractical to determine through objective tests which
individuals were able to perform safely and efficiently.
Just prior to the period covered by this survey, the Supreme Court held that
a union and an employer could enter into an affirmative action plan, allowing
racial preferences in a job training program, without violating Title VII's ban
on discrimination because of race.' 2' The objective was to eliminate manifest

'18Id. § 2000e-2(e); see also 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).
UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991) (holding that infertility in

119E.g.,

women is not a BFOQ for working in jobs exposed to toxic substances that could endanger a
fetus).
120 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
121 Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 192 (1979) (Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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racial imbalances in long-segregated craft jobs. The Court emphasized,
however, that the program did not involve state action and thus did not
implicate the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution. In succeeding
years the Court struck down or closely questioned several affirmative action
plans established by governmental units.
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,122 the Court concluded that
neither generalized "societal discrimination," mere racial imbalance, nor the
desire of a public school system to provide black students with minority teacher
"role models" constituted a sufficiently compelling governmental interest under
the equal protection clause to justify taking race into account in determining
layoffs. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,123 the Court held that "strict
scrutiny" applied even to supposedly "benign" racial classifications by a local
government. 124 But a majority seemed willing to say that a "prima facie"
showing of discrimination by private parties in a contracting program for which
a public entity is ultimately responsible could warrant affirmative remedial
steps by the public body. 125 The strict scrutiny standard was extended to the
federal level in AdarandConstructorsv. Pena 126 The Court remanded the case
to the court of appeals for further consideration, under that standard, of the
Federal Government's program providing for extra compensation for general
contractors hiring subcontractors controlled by "socially and economically
disadvantaged individuals," presumptively including racial minorities.
An exception to this series of anti-affirmative action decisions was Johnson
v. TransportationAgency, Santa ClaraCounty. 127 In an area where women
constituted 36.4% of the labor market, the employer agency had only 22.4%
women. There were no women among the 248 skilled craft positions. In the
eyes of the Court at the time, this "manifest imbalance" was sufficient to sustain
a temporary program taking gender into account in filling craft openings, with
the goal of eventually having 36% women in the craft jobs. Johnson would
seem superseded by Croson'sadoption of a "prima facie" rather than "manifest
imbalance" standard, unless different criteria apply to affirmative action

122 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
123 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
124

Id. at 494-95 (explaining that "strict scrutiny" calls for both a "compelling governmental

interest" and a "narrowly tailored" solution to justify a racial classification).
125

Id. at 492, 509.

126 515 U.S. 200 (1995); see also Adarand Constructors v. Mineta, 534 U.S. 103 (2001);

Adarand Constructors v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216 (2000) (per curiam).
127 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
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programs for racial minorities and for women.1 28 Requiring a prima facie
showing of past or present discrimination before there could be affirmative
action, at least by a public agency, would of course be much more restrictive
than simply having to show a manifest imbalance in the number of minorities or
women.
In two cases decided since this lecture was delivered, the Supreme Court
dealt with affirmative action in the different context ofpublic higher education.
In Grutter v. Bollinger,' 29 the Court sustained the admissions program of the
University of Michigan's Law School, which seeks a "critical mass" of
minorities in its student body, against a challenge that this racial and ethnic
preference violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice O'Connor spoke for the majority in declaring the law school had a
"compelling governmental interest" in securing a diverse student body for the
educational benefit of all students, and the program was "narrowly tailored" to
accomplish this end. Although Grutter was decided only five-to-four,
dissenting Justice Kennedy made for a total of six Justices who were expressly
prepared to accept the principle of "racial diversity" in university admissions
approved by Justice Powell in his deciding opinion in the Bakke case. 130 At the
same time, the Court struck down the admissions program of the University's
undergraduate college, which automatically awarded 20 admission points out of
a possible 150 to "underrepresented minority" applicants and did not provide
the same "highly individualized, holistic review"3 of applicants' total range of
qualifications that was found in the law school.1 '
The positive decision on affirmative action in public higher education will
not automatically be transferable to public (or private) employment. The theory
of diversity in university enrollment is based on enhancing the educational

128 In

constitutional challenges, gender classifications are subject to an intermediate

standard of scrutiny falling somewhere between "strict scrutiny" and "rational basis." Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
129 123 S.Ct. 2325 (2003) (5-4 decision) (Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, Scalia, and
Thomas, JJ., dissenting). Claims under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2000d (2000), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2000) were also denied.
130Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Justice Kennedy's views
are set forth in Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2370. Chief Justice Rehnquist was conspicuously silent on
the status of Bakke.
131Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S.Ct. 2411 (2003) (6-3 decision) (Ginsburg, Souter, and
Stevens, JJ., dissenting). Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment but did notjoin the Court's
opinion. Id. at 2433-34. The majority also found violations of Title VI and 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(2000). Compare Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2343, with
her concurring opinion in Gratz, id. at 2431.
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experience of everyone through the particular insights and opinions brought by
minority students. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutteralso relied
on the "special niche" occupied by a university's freedom of expression and
academic judgments, including student selection, in our constitutional
tradition.1 32 It could be somewhat harder to find analogous compelling
interests, not to mention free-speech claims, in diversifying the work force of a
public agency (or private employer). 133 Yet the heavy emphasis in Grutteron
the vital need to prepare a dive;se group of students for future service in the
corporate and military34worlds would seem encouraging for affirmative action in
employment as well.1
D. SEXUAL HARASSMENT
One of the significant developments of the 1980s was the Supreme Court's
acceptance of sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination prohibited by
Title VII. That was not self-evident; it was earlier argued there is no
discrimination in the absence of some tangible economic loss. But in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 135 the Court dismissed that contention and concluded
there could be actionable harassment through "unwelcome" sexual advances or
other actions creating a "hostile environment." The Meritoropinion also noted
the existence of a second type of sexual harassment. In addition to a hostile
environment, there can be quid pro quo harassment, when sexual favors are
sought in return for preferential job treatment. The Court elaborated on the
elements of a hostile environment harassment claim in Harris v. Forklift
Systems, pointing out that the conduct must be "severe or pervasive enough to
create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment - an environment

132 Grutter, 123 S.Ct. at 2338-39.
133Although the Constitution is generally applicable only to state actors, Titles VI and VII

of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d & e (2000), and other nondiscrimination
statutes also apply to the private sector. But so far the Supreme Court has been more lenient in
appraising affirmative action by private parties under statutory standards. Compare Steelworkers
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 192 (1979) with Wygant v. Jackson Board of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986);
City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995).
134
123 S.Ct. at 2340-41.
...
477 U.S. 57 (1986). See generallyCATHERINE MAcKINNON, SEXUAL HARRASSMENTOF
WORKING WOMEN (1979) (explaining that there can, of course, be racial as well as sexual
harassment on the job).
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that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive 3- 6 [and] the victim does
subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive."'
A highly important question for the victim of harassment on the job is
whether she (it's almost always a woman) can reach the deeper pockets of the
corporate employer. Harassment may be caused either by supervisors or by coworkers. The liability of the employer will vary accordingly. The Supreme
Court attempted to lay down some definitive rules for vicarious liability in
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth.137 When a supervisor takes "tangible
employment action," such as a discharge or an undesirable assignment, it
becomes the action of the employer for Title VII purposes and no affirmative
defense is available.' 38 But when there is no tangible action, and only a hostile
environment, the employer may raise an affirmative defense. The defense
would require proof that (1) the employer took reasonable care to prevent and
correct any sexual harassment and (2) the employee victim unreasonably failed
to avoid harm.' 39 Since nonsupervisory co-workers engaging in harassment
would ordinarily be acting outside the scope of their employment, the employer
will be liable for their conduct only if it is negligent or otherwise at fault.
Justices Thomas and Scalia, dissenting in Ellerth, would not hold an employer
liable even for supervisors' creation of a hostile work environment unless the
victim could prove the employer was negligent in not preventing the
supervisor's conduct.
V. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) 140 is the only totally
new piece of antidiscrimination legislation passed during the time period of this
survey. Very generally it prohibits employment discrimination against a
"qualified individual with a disability because of the disability.' 4' A
"disability" includes a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities., 142 A "qualified" individual is someone

136
137

510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
524 U.S. 742 (1998). The Court noted that "the labels quidpro quo and hostile work

environment are not controlling for purposes of establishing employer liability." Id. at 765; see
also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
138 Burlington, 524 U.S. at 762-63.
139

Id. at 765.

14042

U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
§ 12112(a).
1d. § 12102(2).

141 Id.
42

1
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who can perform the "essential functions" of the job in question with or without
"reasonable accommodation.', 143 "Reasonable accommodation" refers to
adjustments in the facilities44or the job that do not impose "undue hardship" in
terms of cost or difficulty. 1
The Supreme Court started out with a fairly broad notion of the sweep of
the ADA. In more recent years it has appeared to retrench. Thus the Court held,
under the ADA's predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,45 that a person
afflicted with tuberculosis was "handicapped" within the meaning of the statute
and "otherwise qualified" to teach elementary school. 46 Similarly, in Bragdon
v. Abbott, 47 the Court ruled that the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) is a
disability under the ADA even when the infection has not yet progressed to the
symptomatic phase, since it is a physical impairment that substantially limits the
major life activity of reproduction.
Retrenchment was under way in Sutton v. UnitedAir Lines.148 Two twin
sisters both had severe myopia, 20/200 or worse in one eye and 20/400 or
worse in the other. With corrective lenses, however, their vision was 20/20 or
better. 49 When they applied for employment as commercial airline pilots, they
were rejected because they did not meet the employer's requirement of
uncorrected visual acuity of 20/100 or better.' 50 The majority of the Supreme
Court determined that the sisters were not "disabled" under the ADA because
when a person is taking steps to mitigate an impairment, the effects of those
efforts must be considered in deciding whether the individual is "substantially
limited in a major life activity."' ' Even on the assumption that working is a
major life activity, the Court further concluded that the sisters had not shown
they were "regarded" as having a disability limiting a major life activity simply
because they were precluded from holding the one job of airline pilot. The
dissenting Justices labeled this a "miserly" and "narrow" reading of the term
"disability," regardless of the ultimate merits of the sisters' claim.

43

1

144

Id. § 12111(8).
Id. § 12111(9) and (10).

14'29 U.S.C. §§ 701-7961 (2000).
146 School

147 524

Board of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).

U.S. 624 (1998).

148 527

U.S. 471 (1999) (Stevens and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
"9Id. at 475.
"0 Id. at 476.
"5'Id. at 482.
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What constitutes a "major life activity" under the ADA was again to the
fore in Toyota Motor ManufacturingofKentucky v. Williams.152 An employee
claimed she was disabled from performing her automobile assembly linejob by
carpal tunnel syndrome and other problems. 5 3 This time a unanimous Supreme
Court held that in "addressing the major life activity of performing manual
tasks, the central inquiry must be whether the claimant is unable to perform the
variety of tasks central to most people's daily lives, not whether the claimant is
unable to perform the tasks associated with her specific job.' 5 4 Even though
the employee's medical conditions made her avoid sweeping, quit dancing,
occasionally seek help dressing, and reduce the frequency of playing with her
children, gardening, and driving long distances, the Court found these were not
such severe restrictions as to establish a manual-task disability as a matter of
law. The court of appeals' grant of partial summary judgment in her favor was
thus reversed and the case remanded.
In an unusual five-to-four division of the Justices, the Supreme Court held
in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett 155 that ordinarily the ADA does not require an
employer to accommodate a disabled employee by assigning him to a position
to which another employee is entitled under the employer's established
seniority system. But the Court added that the plaintiff may be able to prevent
summary judgment for the employer by showing the job assignment is a
reasonable accommodation because of special circumstances. The Court
considered it irrelevant that the seniority system in this instance was installed by
the employer unilaterally and was not the product of collective bargaining. In
both situations seniority fulfills employee expectations of job security and
steady, predictable advancement.
Barnett may also be notable for a split of the Justices that found dissenters
from both ends of the conservative-liberal spectrum. Justice Breyer spoke for
the Court. Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented, criticizing the Court for the
uncertain state in which it left bonafide seniority systems and insisting that the
accommodation provision of the ADA requires only "the suspension (within
reason) of those employment rules and practices that the employee's disability
prevents him from observing."156 Justices Souter and Ginsburg dissented on the
grounds that nothing in the ADA, unlike Title VII and ADEA, insulated

152

534 U.S. 184 (2002).

153Id. at 187.
4

11

Id. at 200-01.

155 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
156Id.

at 412 (emphasis in the original).
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seniority provisions, and especially a unilaterally imposed system, from the
accommodation requirement, and that the plaintiff here had shown his proposed
accommodation was reasonable.' 57
VI. ARBITRATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE ENFORCEMENT DEVICE

A great debate has developed over the past couple of decades about the
capacity of employers - or employers and unions through collective bargaining
- to substitute arbitration for an employee's right to seek judicial relief for
claims against an employer. Suppose Mary Jones applies for a job and is
presented with a form to sign. It obligates employees to submit all workplace
disputes to an arbitration system devised by the employer rather than to take
them to court. If Mary has the foresight and temerity to ask whether this
arrangement covers statutory claims and whether she must sign if she wants the
job, she is told the answer is "Yes" to both questions. Later, Mary is dismissed
and alleges sex and age discrimination. Despite having signed the employer's
required form, she files a federal court action after having gone through the
necessary EEOC procedure. The employer, needless to say, interposes the
arbitration agreement as a bar to the suit.
Almost thirty years ago the Supreme Court appeared to lay to rest any idea
that private arbitration could displace an employee's resort to statutory
procedures. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,158 the Court held an
arbitrator's adverse decision under a collective bargaining agreement did not
prevent a black employee from pursuing in court a claim his discharge was
based on racial discrimination in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. The Supreme Court reasoned that the arbitrator was only authorized to
decide the contractual issue of discrimination, and not the statutory issue.
Maybe the real reason for the result in Gardner-Denverwas skepticism about
union zeal, at least as of the early 1970s, in pressing Title VII discrimination
cases in contrast to cases of antiunion discrimination.

15

Id. at 420, 423.

158 415 U.S. 36 (1974); see also Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728

(1981) (holding that employees not barred by arbitration award on wage claim under union
contract from suinig under Fair Labor Standards Act). In Gardner-Denver, the Court noted that
the arbitrator's award could be admitted in evidence in subsequent court proceedings, and that if
certain procedural safeguards were observed, the award could be accorded "great weight." 415
U.S. at 60 n. 21.
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In 1991 the Supreme Court seemed to take an abrupt turn away from the
Gardner-Denverapproach. In Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., m5 it
held that an individual stockbroker employee was bound by a contract with the
New York Stock Exchange to arbitrate a claim of age discrimination against his
employer. The Court distinguished Gardner-Denveron the grounds that in
Gilmer the arbitrator was authorized to handle statutory as well as contractual
disputes. 16 The earlier case was also said to involve a "tension" between union
representation and individual statutory rights. Furthermore, the Court stressed
that no loss of statutory rights occurred in Gilmer. It was only a change of
forum. Nevertheless, the Court noted that the stockbroker was not precluded
161
from filing a charge with the EEOC; only his court action was barred.
Gardner-Denverand Gilmer can be distinguished in several ways. The
Court's own emphasis on the authority of the arbitrator will make little
difference, if unions and employers can simply empower arbitrators in the labor
contract to deal with statutory issues. But in Wright v. UniversalMaritimeServ.
Corp., 62 the Court held that any union-negotiated waiver of employees'
statutory right to a judicial forum would have to be "clear and unmistakable."
On the existence of a real distinction between Gardner-Denverand Gilmer,the
explanation of Judge Harry Edwards in Cole v. Burns InternationalSecurity
Services' 63 is more convincing than the Court's. Speaking for the District of
Columbia Circuit, he emphasized that in individual contracts of employment,
the employee manages the arbitration64presentation, while the union is in control
in the collective bargaining setting.
On the other hand, in terms of bargaining power, one can argue that a
union's agreement to arbitrate and waive the judicial forum should be more
acceptable - less of a contract of adhesion - than an isolated individual
employee's agreement. Moreover, any concern that a labor organization might
treat an employee's civil rights cavalierly should be tempered by the existence

159 500 U.S. 20 (1991).

,60/d. at 33-34.
161 Id. at 28. The Court has since held that an individual's agreement to arbitrate
employment disputes does not preclude the EEOC from seeking victim-specific relief in court,
including reinstatement, back pay, and damages. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279
(2002).
162 525 U.S. 70, 80-81 (1998).
163

105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

164 In Wright, Justice Scalia for the Court distinguished between "an individual's waiver of
his own rights [in Gilmer], rather than a union's waiver of the rights of represented employees."
525 U.S. at 80.
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of the well-established union duty of fair representation. 65 Significantly, the
Supreme Court in Wright recognized, but did not resolve, the question of
whether "Gardner-Denver'sseemingly absolute prohibition
of union waiver of
' 66
employees' federal forum rights survives Gilmer."'
The theoretical arguments against so-called mandatory arbitration
agreements are very powerful. Congress, or some other legislative body, has
prohibited various types of employment discrimination and has prescribed
certain procedures for the vindication of those statutory rights. The specified
procedures, sometimes including the right to a jury trial, may be almost as
important as the substantive rights themselves. No employer, acting either alone
or in conjunction with a union, should be able to force an employee to waive
the statutorily provided forum and procedures as the price of getting or keeping
a job. Conditioning employment on the surrender of statutory entitlements
would seem a blatant affront to public policy. Numerous scholars, two federal
agencies, and two prestigious private bodies have gone on
record as opposed to
67
claims.1
employment
statutory
of
arbitration
mandatory

165

See, e.g., Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 393 U.S. 324 (1969); Rubber Workers

Local Union No. 12 v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967);
Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). Applying modem "public choice" theory
concerning the political power of cohesive minority groups within any organization, one scholar
has predicted that unions would not agree to arbitrate statutory claims if such groups believed
arbitration was not in their best interest. Sarah Rudolph Cole, A Funny Thing Happenedon the
Way to the (Alternative) Forum: Reexamining Alexander v. Gardner-Denver in the Wake of
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 1997 BYU L. REv. 591, 605 (1997).
166 Wright, 525 U.S. at 80.
167 See, e.g., EEOC, Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy, 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) FEP
405:7301, 405:7302 (1997); Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Claims: Doctrineand Policy in the Wake ofGilmer, 14 HoFsTRA LAB. L. J.1 (1996); Katherine
Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitrationof IndividualEmployment Rights: the Yellow Dog
Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U.L. REv. 1017 (1996). In July 1997, the EEOC issued a
longer and even stronger condemnation of compulsory arbitration or pre-dispute agreements to
arbitrate, declaring that "even the best arbitral systems do not afford the benefits of the judicial
system." EEOC, MandatoryArbitrationofEmployment DiscriminationDisputesas a Condition
of Employment, 8 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) FEP 405:7511, 405:7520 (1997). According to the
court in Cole v. Burns InternationalSecurity Services, 105 F.3d 1465, 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1997),
the NLRB General Counsel has been prepared to issue unfair labor practice complaints on the
issue. See also U.S. DEP'TS OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, DUNLOPCOMMISSIONONTHEFUTUREOF
WORKER MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 33 (December 1994);
National Academy of Arbitrators, Statement on Condition of Employment Agreements, in
ARBITRATION 1997: THE NExT FIFTY YEARS, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTIETH ANNUAL MEETING,
NAT'L ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 312 (Joyce M. Najita ed. 1998).
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Yet facts often trump theory. Highly pragmatic considerations indicate that
the ordinary rank-and-file worker may be better off with the actuality of
arbitration, even of the mandatory variety, than with the beguiling, but often
illusory, possibility of a court suit. Experienced plaintiffs' attorneys have
estimated that only about 5 % of the individuals with an employment claim who
seek help from the private bar are able to obtain counsel. 168 Of course, some of
those who are rejected will not have meritorious claims. But others will be
workers whose potential dollar recovery will simply notjustify the investment
of the time and money of an experienced lawyer in preparing a court action. For
those individuals, the cheaper, simpler process of arbitration is the most feasible
recourse. It will cost a lawyer far less time and effort to take a case to
arbitration; at worst, claimants can represent themselves or be represented by
laypersons in this much less formal and intimidating forum.
Several studies show that employees actually prevail more often in
arbitration than in court. The American Arbitration Association in one study
found a winning rate of 63 % for arbitral claimants. 169 In a much-criticized
system operated by the securities industry, employees still prevailed 55% of the
time, according to the U.S. General Accounting Office. 170 By contrast,
claimants' success rates in separate surveys of federal court and EEOC cases
were only 14.9% and 16.8%, respectively. 171 Even if the latter figures are
somewhat skewed because they may omit pretrial settlements, the relative
attractiveness of arbitration for claimants cannot be denied. 72 As might be
expected, successful plaintiffs obtain larger awards from judges or juries. But
claimants as a group recover more in arbitration. 173 All these statistics reflect
74
the situation before the American Bar Association's Due Process Protocol

168Lewis L. Maltby, PrivateJustice: Employment ArbitrationandCivil Rights, 30 COLUM.

HUM. RTs. L. REv. 29, 58 (1998).
169 Id. at 46.
170 Id. at 50.
171Id. at 46, 48.
172Cf Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage from Using
MandatoryArbitrationforDiscriminationClaims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 418-62 (2000). For
more sympathetic treatments of mandatory arbitration than those provided by the first wave of
academic commentators, see Richard A. Bales, Creating and Challenging Compulsory
ArbitrationAgreements, 13 LAB. LAW. 511 (1998); Samuel Estreicher, Pre-disputeAgreements
to Arbitrate Statutory Employment Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1344 (1997); Susan A.
FitzGibbon, Reflections on Gilmer and Cole, I EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL. J. 221 (1997).
171 Maltby, supra note 166, at 54.
174
Task Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment, A Due ProcessProtocol
for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment
Relationship,Disp. RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 37. The Task Force consisted of management,
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was adopted, when many flawed systems were in existence. Arbitration
procedures should be even more favorable for employees now. In short, for me
the key is not the mandatory nature of the agreement but the accessibility and
fairness of the arbitration system in actual operation.
Arbitration received a further boost from the Supreme Court in CircuitCity
Stores v. Adams. 175 The only issue directly before the Court was whether the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),' 716 which mandates thejudicial enforcement of a
wide range of arbitration agreements, exempts contracts of employment
generally, or only the contracts oftransportation workers. The Court opted, five
to four, for the narrower exclusion, thus covering everyone except
transportation workers. 177 In my view that promotes the salutary notion of
broad, more uniform federal standards of arbitrability in employment. Still, a
vast number of worker-rights supporters were convinced that what was at stake
was the spread of the perfidious Gilmer doctrine of mandatory arbitration, and
that this had to be stopped.17 8 Yet it strikes me that lifetime federal judges may
well be readier than many
state judges to protect employees from abuse by
79
1
employers.
overreaching
VII. CONCLUSION
The last two decades have continued the shift of emphasis from labor law
to employment law - from governmental regulation of union-management
relations, with collective bargaining expected to set most of the substantive
terms of employment, to the direct governmental regulation of more and more

union, and plaintiffs' attorneys from the ABA and the National Employment Lawyers
Association, and representatives of the American Arbitration Association, the American Civil
Liberties Union, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the National Academy of
Arbitrators, and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution
171 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
176 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
177 The minority is probably supported by the legislative history, but I believe both the
statutory text and sound policy are on the side of the majority. Of course, the FAA only applies
to employees covered by the interstate commerce clause.
178 Twenty-eight governmental units or private groups filed briefs as amici
curiae, urging
that the FAA not apply to contracts of employment. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 108-09.
179 See, e.g., Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir.
2003) (numerous
"unconscionable" provisions; applying California law); Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 279 F.3d
889 (9th Cir. 2002) (on remand) ("unconscionable" contract of adhesion; applying California
law), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1112 (2002); Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933, 938
(4th Cir. 1999) (striking down employer's unilaterally established "one-sided" arbitration
procedures).
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aspects of the employer-employee relationship. Insofar as that fills in gaps in
the protection of workers which would otherwise never be covered, it is all to
the good. Insofar as it diminishes private initiative and the voluntary
arrangements that have made collective bargaining such a uniquely valuable
American institution, it must be deemed a cause for regret. One likes to think
that in such gatherings as the Carl Warns Labor and Employment Law Institute,
we can help each other better understand the processes at work and thus try to
achieve a more ideal balance between public and private governance. If I may
use a racetrack analogy, in this of all places: the best laws are like the best
jockeys; they know when to tighten the reins, and they know when to let the
horses run.
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